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Abstract 
Recognising how close humankind is to precipitating dangerous climate 
change, activists are seeking strategies to achieve transformational social 
change. But are they there yet? This article asks: what are the most important 
steps that grassroots climate activist groups would need to take to achieve that 
goal? The article’s initial focus is on the global fossil fuel divestment 
movement, a leader in contemporary grassroots activism. It argues that the 
movement will only realise its potential when it engages in broader networks 
and alliances, overcomes the psychological ‘hard wiring’ that makes people 
resistant to climate change bad news, and engages in ‘big organising’. 
However, the movement’s greatest contribution will be as part of broader 
‘webs of influence’ involving multiple actors and agendas and a diversity of 
strategies and mechanisms. It argues that these can play important roles in 
steering events on the global stage. It concludes that while states and 
international agreements will be crucial to achieving a low carbon future, 
bottom up approaches driven by advocacy organisations and their allies and 
wider networks and webs of influence are also important, not least in 
stimulating changes in beliefs and norms, and through this, in influencing 
behavioural change. 
 
Keywords: governance, divestment, climate change, activism, networks, social 
movement. 
 
1. Introduction  
Climate change is of such a scale and complexity as to defy simple or single 
solutions, therefore  action on many fronts is necessary to address it. The Paris 
Climate Agreement is a considerable advance but its reliance on voluntary 
mechanisms suggests the need to look beyond government action alone for 
effective action (Christoff, 2016). Multiple initiatives involving multiple climate 
actors at multiple levels will be necessary if climate change is to be contained, 
including a transformational grassroots movement capable of raising public 
consciousness,  nurturing a new norm and through this, political pressure for a 
rapid transition to a low carbon economy. 
This recognition prompted Bill McKibben and others, at the urging of 
mainstream environment NGOs, to launch the global fossil fuel divestment 
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movement, comprising 350.org (hereafter 3501) and subsequently, other activist 
groups. This movement is principally based on an ethical argument: ‘If it’s 
wrong to wreck the climate, then surely it’s wrong to profit from that wreckage’ 
and, for that reason,  institutional investors should divest their fossil fuel assets.  
While the movement’s ostensible target is institutional investors who it 
pressures to divest, its real target is the fossil fuel industry, which it identifies as 
the villain of the piece. Its aim is to remove the industry’s social license to 
operate, threaten its reputational capital and turn it into a pariah. Doing so is 
intended to raise public awareness of a climate change crisis and of the role of 
fossil fuel extracting companies in precipitating it, and to nurture a new social 
norm: go fossil free.  
The movement has a clear and credible theory of change (governments will only 
take decisive action where a groundswell of public opinion compels them to do 
so): a clear target (the fossil fuel industry); and an established set of actions 
(divest) which are aligned around shared values (it’s wrong to profit from 
climate change). This is in marked contrast to the experience of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ and ‘Occupy’ movement where mass demonstrations energised followers 
and gained substantial attention but were not underpinned by any coherent 
ongoing strategy and were ultimately unsuccessful. 
The divestment movement has made impressive progress during the first five 
years of its evolution, having persuaded 688 institutions and 58,399 individuals 
across 76 countries to commit to divesting from fossil fuel companies. The value 
of assets represented by these institutions and individuals is conservatively 
estimated at US $5trillion, up from $3.4 trillion the previous year (Arabella 
Advisors, 2016). However, it is not yet, and would not claim to be, either alone 
or with its allies, a transformational social movement2.  
In previous articles, the writer examined the divestment movement’s evolution, 
aims, and strategies thorough the lens of the social and environmental 
movements literature. That analysis showed how the movement has developed 
an organisational vehicle facilitating effective mobilisation and grassroots 
activism, exploited political opportunities, engaged in innovative and sometimes 
disruptive forms of protest and used cognitive framing and symbolic politics to 
gain media interest and persuade the public of the importance and legitimacy of 
its claims (Gunningham 2017a, b). The relative instrumental, structural, and 
discursive power of the movement and its adversaries was also examined, 
showing how, notwithstanding the fossil fuel industry’s deeply embedded 
                                                 
1 The number 350 was chosen because 350 parts per million is, according to some scientists, the 
maximum acceptable concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, beyond which 
‘dangerous’ climate change becomes increasingly likely.  
2 ‘Transformational social change’ in this article is not used as a term of art but simply implies far 
reaching change, as in a transition from a carbon based to a low or zero carbon economy. A 
transformational social movement in turn is ‘a group of people with a common interest who band 
together to pursue a far-reaching transformation of society. Their power lies in popular 
mobilisation to influence the holders of political and economic power’. (O’Brien et al., 2000, p. 
12). 
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structural and instrumental power, the movement has managed to shift the 
contest onto a terrain where it holds a comparative advantage.  
These arguments will not be rehearsed here. Instead this article asks: what are 
the most important steps that would need to be taken to achieve 
transformational change: by 350, by the wider climate change movement of 
which it forms a part and by a web of other climate actors? The article’s initial 
focus will be on 350 because it is at the leading edge of transnational grassroots 
activism, and indeed was established largely because an effective grassroots 
movement did not exist (in contrast to policy oriented, lobbying, knowledge 
disseminating, green consumerist and partnership based NGOs) (Beinecke, 
2015)3. However, since its ultimate success will depend largely upon its 
interactions with other actors, not just within the climate movement but also 
more broadly, these webs of influence are also explored.  
One important assumption in the following analysis should be emphasised, 
namely that addressing climate change is feasible within the political and 
economic structures of capitalism. As such, it does not engage with anti-
capitalist ‘system change not climate change’ approaches4, not because such 
approaches should not be taken seriously (even where one disagrees with them) 
but because doing so would require an extended and entirely different analysis 
which is not practicable within the confines of a single article. 
Following this introduction Part 2 examines the limitations of the divestment 
movement in its present form and what further actions and what broader 
alliances and networks it, and the the climate movement more broadly, would 
need to participate in if it is to catalyse a rapid transition from a fossil-fuel based 
to a low-carbon economy. Part 3 takes this theme further, arguing that the 
movement is best understood as part of a broader web of influence and that the 
interactions within this web will be crucial in generating the momentum 
necessary to precipitate far reaching change. Part 4 concludes.  
Recognizing that activist networks are best studied through their campaigns and 
impact, a case study approach was adopted, the principal methodology being 
qualitative field-based research, which was undertaken in Australia, the UK and 
the USA, the three countries in which the movement has been most active. 
Specifically, 38 semi-structured interviews were conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted principles (Minichiello, Aroni and Hayes, 2008) with a 
sample of stakeholders including activists, campaign managers and influential 
figures within the movement, investment fund managers (particularly those 
vulnerable to public pressure), banks and industry consultants. Participant 
observation of campaign events such as national days of action, strategy 
meetings and local activist events complemented the interview data. Other 
                                                 
3 This is not to detract from the considerable achievements of transnational and largely grassroots 
NGOs such as Greenpeace and FOE but such organisations have broader agendas and at least at 
the time of writing, have a less active presence and less impact than the Divestment Movement 
within the sphere of climate activism. 
4 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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documentation and data within the public domain were used to corroborate, 
illustrate and/or challenge participants’ statements in interviews and to verify 
factual details and statements of intended aims and aspirations. Finally, the 
social movement literature was reviewed. While not all the issues raised in the 
previous paragraph can be fully addressed by a case study of a single social 
movement, this article does provide some provisional answers to a number of 
key strategic questions.  
 
2. Towards transformation 
2.1 Divestment’s limited reach  
We live in an age of networked governance, and a characteristic of recent 
successful social movements has been their capacity, facilitated by modern 
communication technologies, to develop such networks, encompassing not just 
their traditional allies but also other groups with whom they might make 
common cause (Castells, 2000). While the divestment movement has worked 
closely with like-minded organisations through vehicles such as the Climate 
Action Network (internationally), the Fossil Fuel Divestment Student Network 
(in the USA), the Stop Adani campaign (in Australia) and Fossil Free UK (in 
tandem with partners People and Planet and Operation Noah), it has largely 
failed to exploit the benefits of broader engagement. with ‘a politically, 
economically and socially diverse range of stakeholders’ that include ‘a wider 
range of stakeholders, each with different aims but all with resources  - such as 
expertise, knowledge, access, support or legitimacy – with which to bargain’ 
(Bomberg 2012, 418 and 419) .  
Indeed, when compared to a typical network combining ‘the voluntary energy 
and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the financial muscle and interest of 
business and the enforcement and the rule-making power and coordination and 
capacity-building skills of states and international organizations’ (Reinicke and 
Deng, 2000, 24), the divestment movement’s alliances appear one-dimensional. 
For the most part, they have been concerned with coordinating campaigns with 
other like-minded activist groups rather than with creating ‘a synergy between 
different competencies and sources of knowledge’ (Dedeurwaedere 2005, 2) as 
more developed networks do. For example, there is little evidence of 
“‘mobilization networks’ comprised of a diverse range of actors who share 
resources and bargain as they seek consensus on how best to ‘steer’ society 
towards a low carbon future” and each of whom has distinctive resources, 
specialisation and expertise which it brings to the table (Bomberg, 2012, 424). 
Yet notwithstanding these limitations, the divestment movement has been the 
most prominent attempt to date to build a grassroots global climate movement, 
to the point where it is ‘arguably the most effective and well organised enemy of 
fossil fuel in the world’ (Stevens, 2016) and ‘the fastest growing [such] 
movement in history’ (Vaughn, 2014).  Previous grassroots movements have 
sprung up at local level, but never managed to extend their reach or their 
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alliances, others have withered as many did following the Global Financial 
Crisis, or were ‘subsumed in a wider push against corporate power’ (Rosewarne, 
Goodman and Pearse, 2013, 11). Exceptionally, Greenpeace has maintained a 
genuine grassroots presence over many years, and Friends of the Earth (the core 
node in the anti-fracking movement in Europe) also has a grassroots component 
albeit in tandem with a heavy lobbying presence in the halls of power, but 
neither has focused its attention mainly or exclusively on climate change.  
There remains however, considerable scope for the divestment movement to 
achieve far more than it has so far done. For example, as a leader of the Serbian 
Otpor movement once pointed out: ‘if we want to win, we need to step out of the 
university bubble and work with ordinary people’ who are not already connected 
with the movement’s networks (Engler and Engler, 2016, 69). This insight is 
every bit as relevant to the climate movement as it is to other campaigns and 
indeed this is increasingly recognised in the United States, where 350 is 
beginning to develop ‘transition alliances’ with diverse social actors which are 
serious about addressing climate change (Boeve, 2015). However, this is far less 
the case in the UK and Australia. For example, in the UK, one 350 campaigner, 
acknowledging the limited networks that had been developed beyond ‘the usual 
suspects’ pointed particularly to lack of engagement with financial institutions 
as an example: ‘we don’t have contacts with financial markets, apart from two 
small ethical investment managers. That’s about it”. Similarly, in Australia, 
another campaigner, echoing the comments of others, reported that ‘one of my 
chief frustrations is our inability to overcome the hurdle of engaging broad 
audiences’.  
While a failure to network more broadly, is a critique that is particularly 
apposite in the case of the divestment movement, it also applies, at least in some 
jurisdictions, to many other climate NGOs. Certainly some of these, in contrast 
to 350, are involved in lobbying and other forms of engagement with 
mainstream politics and politicians. Some too have begun reaching out to 
indigenous and health groups amongst others. But for the most part, outside of 
the USA, these initiatives are still relatively limited, an impression that was 
confirmed by one consultant with extensive experience of working with climate 
NGOs internationally: ‘I don’t see a commitment to inter-sectional organising. 
Australia is ten to fifteen years behind North America’. To a lesser extent, the 
same criticism can be made of UK climate NGOs although at one time the Stop 
Climate Chaos coalition might have been an exception.  
Recognising the limitations of the current modus operandi of 350 and its like-
minded allies, particularly in Australia and the UK, raises the question: what 
could be done differently and what might it take for the climate movement to 
realise its transformative potential? This question will be addressed in three 
parts: (i) recognising the critique above, by exploring the need to build broader 
alliances and how this might best be achieved (section 2.2): (ii) through 
harnessing various opportunities such as exploiting the vulnerabilities of 
opponents, digital amplification and various scaling up techniques (section 2.3); 
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and (iii) building and taking advantage of webs of influence to maximise 
effectiveness (section 3). 
 
2.2 Building broader alliances 
As this section will argue, there are multiple means of extending the climate 
movement’s networks and establishing mutually beneficial relationships with 
other climate actors. The latter include other civil society organisations, the 
politically disengaged, the political right, the state, international organisations 
and business dominated epistemic communities. 
Understandably, building broader alliances, particularly with unlikely 
bedfellows, can be challenging. For example, finding common cause with trade 
unions can be problematic, particularly where some members are employed in 
fossil fuel related industries. Here the climate movement’s increasing emphasis 
on a just transition to a low carbon economy, and a clear articulation as to how 
displaced workers would be treated, and new jobs in renewables created, will be 
crucial. A focus on communities that will be impacted by the closure of fossil 
fuel facilities and on mitigation and compensation funds in tandem with a new 
‘green industrial policy’ will be crucial. The latter might arguably be on the 
model of the German Energiewende (Healy and Barry, 2017) and form part of a 
broader roadmap of a socially and economically just transition. This however, is 
a long way from current thinking within parts of the movement. As one activist 
acknowledged: ‘we have difficulty forming relationships with unions, I think 
largely because the movement too easily slips into stereotypes … there are 
elements of the climate movement that make it difficult to support a great deal 
of the work being done in the union movement”.  Nevertheless, in the US at 
least, climate NGOs, including 350, are increasingly emphasising that 
environmentalism is good for the economy and that addressing climate change 
provides considerable job-creation opportunities and genuine ‘blue-green’ 
alliances are being established. 
Developing relationships with some on the right of politics also becomes 
important given the desirability of developing as broad a coalition as possible, 
but has been largely neglected to date. Doing so will require identifying areas 
where conservative principles are consistent with environmental protection or 
tacitly agreeing to disagree about many things (including even the very 
existence of climate change), while working together where common ground can 
be found. Home solar panel systems for example, may be supported by some on 
the right because their purchase is consistent with the free market, consumer 
choice, and national security. As one Green Tea Party member put it: ‘Rooftop 
solar makes it harder for terrorists to render a devastating blow to our power 
grid. There’s nothing more centralized in our nation’ (Kormann, 2015).  
While developing broader alliances across the ideological divide will not be easy, 
and risks blunting the movement’s radical edge, it should not be forgotten that 
addressing climate change is not inherently inconsistent with right-of-centre 
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values: Margaret Thatcher recognised that climate change was important and 
needed to be addressed and American conservatives such as William F Buckley 
and Barry Goldwater were also strong advocates for action to protect the 
environment (Farber, 2017). Having said this, in the USA it has become an 
article of faith for Republicans to deny the importance and often the existence of 
climate change, suggesting the need for a substantial reframing (a new 
technological revolution, green jobs, climate change as a threat to our values 
and lifestyle etc) to better engage with the right and to transcend political 
tribalism (Marshall, 2014). Indeed, insofar as the polarisation of right and left 
can be overcome and useful advocacy coalitions developed, it is likely to be 
through a reframing of the climate issue. Such a reframing would involve 
multiple narratives, one or more of which would engage particular sectors of the 
population, and mindful that, as in a war, people who disagree on many things 
may still unite in fighting a common threat. And wherever such broader 
connections can be make it will be fundamentally important to ‘actively hire 
new people from the under-represented group who can work through their 
networks. Then enable them to develop communications that speak to others 
like themselves using their own values’ (Marshall, 2015, emphasis added). The 
broader lesson is that it is vital to enlist trusted messengers and to work with 
local partners who are credible figures within their own communities, whether 
these be Republicans, indigenous leaders, influential religious figures or trade 
union officials.  
Allies might also be sought in other unconventional places. For example the 
political, military and humanitarian risks of climate change are becoming 
increasingly apparent, suggesting opportunities to make common cause with 
such unlikely bedfellows as the security forces and the military and more 
comfortable ones with aid agencies and charities like Oxfam. Other connections 
are already being made, as with a coalition of 30 Australian health and medical 
groups which launched a world-first National Climate and Health Strategy 
framework in 2017, or the incorporation within the Stop Adani campaign, 
discussed below, of some indigenous groups. Similarly, Paul Gilding has 
suggested the potential for alliances ‘between those concerned about economic 
and political stability, those who are inspired by the technology and business 
opportunities and those concerned about climate change’ (Gilding, 2011, 6). 
Currently, USA 350.org Executive Director May Boeve and her colleagues have 
gone much further than their counterparts in the UK or Australia, taking the 
view that climate change connects every issue and emphasizing the importance 
of identifying how those connections might be developed (Alter, 2015). 
Developing such alliances however, is very much a work in progress.  
A closely related need is to find ways of engaging with those who feel left behind 
by globalisation, including many of those who voted for Trump and Brexit and 
the growing number of those who have lost faith in the major political parties. 
This will not be easy. Hochschild, for exampledescribes how in southwestern 
Louisiana, one of the most polluted environments in America, voters are 
strongly opposed to environmental regulation and climate change denial is 
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deeply embedded (Hochschild, 2016). Such analyses provide a rich 
understanding of the beliefs of such communities but offer far less as to ways in 
which those beliefs might be successfully challenged, while others writing on 
this topic tend to approach it with bemusement tinged with despair (Bageant, 
2007). Yet the formation of the Green Tea Party, mentioned above, and of such 
offshoots as Floridians for Solar Choice, an ‘inchoate alliance of libertarians, 
Christian Coalition conservatives, liberal environmentalists, and eighty-five Tea 
Party groups’ suggests that understanding the motivations of those who feel 
disenfranchised and engaging with at least some components of this amorphous 
group, might pay dividends. The movement itself must take some responsibility 
for not reaching out to those who are attracted to populism. One activist for 
example suggested that the movement suffers from: “a form of intellectual 
elitism that claims a debatable acceptance of minorities at the expense of 
inclusion of others – particularly the working class”.  
So too and in contrast to the political right, the climate movement has not fully 
come to terms with the fact that ‘close [election] campaigns are decided by the 
least informed, least engaged voters. These voters do not go looking for political 
news and information’. This necessitates ‘brutally simple communication with 
clear choices that hit the voter, whether they like it or not’ (attributed to an 
advisor of former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper quoted in Mogus, 
2015). The implication is that climate activists need to focus more on engaging 
with community based media, regional and local newspapers and bloggers 
(Mogus, 2015). They also have to identify a framing that connects effectively 
with such a disengaged section of the public and continue repeating it through 
multiple avenues and in multiple ways in the hope of ‘sending a breakthrough 
signal in a tuned-out world’ (Mogus, 2015).  
Equally important will be gaining ‘the support of state actors to endorse their 
norms and make norm socialization part of their agenda’ (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, 900). This is also something the divestment movement has not 
so far done, and indeed scepticism about the possibilities of constructive 
engagement with the major political parties has often resulted in their being 
consciously by-passed. Certainly, the movement’s model of change assumes that 
ultimately, once a sufficient proportion of the public is persuaded of the need for 
far-reaching climate action governments will follow, but its failure to engage 
with the latter directly and in the short term, may prove to be a misjudgment, at 
least on the evidence of social movement theorists such as Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998). Having said this, some other climate NGOs have directly 
engaged with the political process and particularly with progressive forces 
within mainstream politics. Friends of the Earth’s attempt to pressure the UK 
Government to pass the Climate Change Bill is one well known example 
(Nulman, 3, 24, 143). The importance of such initiatives is also emphasized by 
those who point out that the most powerful impact on public perceptions of 
climate change in the United States is the stance taken by a polarized political 
elite (in the US, Democratic Congressional action statements and Republican 
roll-call votes (McDonald, 2009, 52). 
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article 
Volume 10 (1-2): 149 - 169 (summer-winter 2018)  Gunningham, Mobilising civil society 
157 
 
The divestment movement, in particular, has also made few efforts to connect 
with potentially sympathetic International Organisations (IOs). According to 
one 350 campaign manager: ‘as a campaign tactic we don’t lobby international 
organisations …but we sometimes conduct forums they might come to.’ 
Nevertheless, 350 has received endorsement from the high echelons of a 
number of such organisations. These include the World Bank, the United 
Nations Environment Program and the International Energy Agency. Such 
approval has served to increase the movement’s legitimacy and authority and to 
underpin the credibility of its message as well as providing leverage and 
resources not otherwise available (reference removed). Greater contact with 
such organisations would nevertheless be beneficial, as for example in ensuring 
that the movement and these organisations were ‘singing from the same song 
sheet’. Networking might also reveal untapped opportunities for such 
organizations to act as ‘orchestrators’ by, for example, ‘building private 
capacities… convening, facilitating and participating in collaborative 
arrangements; [or] providing material and ideational support’. (Abbott, 2011, 
2). While 350 may not consider such networking the best use of scarce 
resources, some other NGOs have expended much more energy on such 
networking but in doing so are not infrequently captured by the UNFCCC 
process (Rosewarne, Goodman and Pearse, 2013, 14). 
Also crucial to the climate movement’s future progress will be the extent to 
which it is able to engage with business-dominated epistemic communities 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000), and in particular with institutional investors. 
The latter can play a pivotal role in providing capital to finance the transition to 
a low-carbon economy, driven by the necessity to protect client assets from 
global climate risks. Specifically, over the next 15 years, an estimated $90 trillion 
will be needed to facilitate low-carbon infrastructure investment, much of which 
only the financial sector can provide. Engaging with institutional investors on the 
issue of how this massive redirection of capital flows might best proceed, could 
give the climate movement a constructive influence in shaping the future in ways 
it has barely begun to contemplate. What further role, for example, might the 
movement play in facilitating a shift in risk perceptions such that asset owners 
and managers become more willing to invest in low carbon technologies? What 
would it take to persuade a wide range of financial institutions and asset classes 
to manage climate risks across the financial system as a matter of enlightened 
self-interest? How might the movement shame the recalcitrant who resist the 
pressure to embrace sustainable investment?  
Moreover, the ‘quiet revolution’ (UNEP Finance Initiative 2017) in the 
perceptions and behavior of institutional investors that is in its early stages, 
gives the climate movement a rare opportunity to exploit divisions among 
institutional investors, and to engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy that can, 
according to Braithwaite and Drahos’s (2000) exhaustive study of global 
business regulation, be a particularly effective means for the weak to overcome 
the strong. Such action might involve: raising awareness about the need for such 
a revolution (for example drawing attention to how climate change threatens 
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water and food production supply-chains); lobbying governments and 
regulators to support it by means such as mandating disclosure of climate risks; 
threatening the social license of banks that persist in lending to fossil fuel 
projects; providing reputation rewards to those who embrace sustainable 
investments; and otherwise raising the consciousness of financial markets about 
the financial risks of fossil fuel investment. While the movement recognizes that 
‘it’s best we stay behind the curtain [and] to have a public separation of 
advocates and private industry’, its broader efforts to warn of the risks of 
‘stranded assets’ might nevertheless be important in accelerating change at a 
time when there are the early signs of a ‘deep shift’ across the finance sector 
(UNEP Finance Initiative 2017).   
 
2.3 Harnessing opportunities 
While the climate movement must grapple with many obstacles, recognising 
and coming to terms with them also presents windows of opportunity. The latter 
include crafting climate change messages to be consistent with what we know 
about human psychology, exploiting the vulnerabilities of opponents, using 
social media to harness digital amplication, and using big data, directed action 
campaigns and other techniques to facilitate scaling up. 
As psychologists point out, humans have perceptual, cognitive and affective 
information processing limitations that are ‘hard-wired’ and these make the 
threats of climate change difficult to appreciate and contribute to climate 
change denialism (Marshall, 2014; Markowitz and Shariff, 2015). Yet 
recognising these limitations opens up new strategies for change. For example, 
“human decision-makers, including policymakers, do not necessarily or even 
predominantly think, decide and act like Homo economicus” and so “we need to 
consider and use the full range of human motivations and goals and the full 
range of decision processes available to Homo sapiens as we consider action and 
behaviour change in the context of climate change” (Weber 2015, 563, 577). 
Connecting climate change to human health, mindful of Maslow’s hierarchy (as 
a number of climate NGOs are now doing), may be one particularly fruitful 
strategy, given that in the US coal is responsible for an estimated 13,000 
premature deaths each year and 800,000 globally (Endcoal). So also may 
drawing attention to coal being the largest source of man-made pollution 
worldwide, given that the public’s aversion to pollution, in the US at least, is 
currently much greater than its concern about climate change (Ansolabehere 
and Konisky, 2014, 13-15, 171-175). Psychology further suggests that the burdens 
on future generations rather than the benefits of avoiding climate change should 
be emphasized and that appeals should be made to ‘hope, pride and gratitude 
rather than guilt, shame and anxiety’ (Markowitz and Shariff, 2012, 245). 
Finally, a framing that is couched in terms of there being a ‘climate emergency’ 
of such a magnitude that the public must be led into ‘emergency mode’ or put on 
a ‘war footing’ might more effectively penetrate public disengagement 
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(Salamon, 2016) particularly if it is coupled with a focus on the positive 
consequences of change (Weber, 2015, 577).  
The ability to seize moments of opportunity and exploit the weaknesses of 
opponents also appears to be fundamentally important. For example, Gandhi 
understood that a vulnerability of British Rule was that it was built upon Indian 
complicity (Brown, 2011, 63) while the civil rights movement saw opportunity in 
the reliable violence of the police and others, images of which were broadcast 
internationally (McAdam, 2011, 75-76). But violence by agents of the State is 
unlikely to be prompted by the divestment movement, nor is the non-violence of 
350 and its allies likely play out in the shadow of threatened violence by other 
sympathisers, a juxtaposition which arguably advanced the American civil rights 
movement (Nimtz, 2016). On the other hand, the divestment movement, like 
Ghandi, is adept at ‘creating and manipulating images of moral resistance’ and 
is well versed in political theatre (Brown, 2011, 59). Finally, ‘successful 
movements depend critically on the capacity of insurgents to recognize and 
exploit the opportunities afforded them by environmental change processes’ 
(McAdam, 2011, 70). This too is well recognized by the divestment movement, 
as its response to the proposed development of a mega-coalmine by the Indian 
company, Adani, described in section 3 below, amply illustrates. On the other 
hand, both corporations and governments are immeasurably more adept at 
playing their own media games than they were two or three decades ago.  
As multiple civil society organisations have found, harnessing the social media 
and information technology has also become central to effective social action. 
Successful social movements are adept at using social networks to facilitate 
remote organising and the establishment of self-starting groups (Castells, 2012). 
For example, focusing promotion efforts on Facebook (and Facebook 
communities) in conjunction with videos that can be readily uploaded to that 
platform demonstrably facilitates digital amplification. Indeed, as Mogus has 
argued, the ‘best way to grow momentum and influence is to piggy back on a 
sound digital strategy on top of solid real world organizing’ (Mogus, 2015), 
combining off-line community organising with digital innovation (see generally 
Wolfson, 2014). For example, Jacobs (2016, 319) describes how online 
campaigning organisation, Avaaz, built support by ‘deploying an imaginative 
combination of online petitions and email campaigns, with street protests and 
paid for advertisements in newspapers … Avaaz acquired new supporters at a 
rate of a million a month. Entirely self-financed from small donations, it had 
reached 42 million global supporters by the time of the Paris conference’. Again, 
350.org has been no slouch at harnessing social media but this is a rapidly 
evolving game in which no player can afford to lag (on which see the ‘Bernie 
dialer’ below). In short, the internet and social media provide considerable 
opportunities to disseminate information, raise funding, recruit volunteers,  
build a base of volunteers and donors and disseminate a message.   
A final, and related key to success is scaling up, a technique exemplified in the 
Bernie Sanders Presidential Primaries campaign. Drawing from their experience 
on that campaign, Bond and Exley advocate a form of ‘big organizing’ that 
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leverages new, social technology ‘to talk to everybody and allow thousands to 
scale up into leadership roles’ (2016, 6) through directed action campaigns. 
While such campaigns have a centralised plan which incorporates agreed 
actions, performance targets and milestones, they distribute the work of 
achieving them to volunteers using such techniques as ‘barnstorming’ (using 
campaign rallies as a technology to bring people together to form volunteer-
driven work teams). Barnstorms are designed to be replicable so that they can 
also be run by volunteers who have been recruited and trained by the organisers 
but who in turn can recruit and train others (and so on) so that the movement 
scales up rapidly.  Those who sign up at barnstorms either volunteer to 
participate in phone banks that call voters across the country or agree to host 
such phone banks in their neighbourhood, recognising that ‘the gold standard in 
any campaign for changing hearts and minds is a personal conversation 
between a volunteer and a voter at the door or on the phone’ (Bond and Exley, 
2016, 185).  
A further breakthrough was the ‘Bernie Dialer’, a technology that enabled phone 
bank volunteers to engage in many phone conversations with voters per hour, 
rather than just a few, as had been the case when much time was wasted waiting 
on unanswered calls. In this, as in the campaign’s other successful experiments, 
the key was to ‘put consumer software, connected by custom coding, at the 
center of our distributed campaigning efforts.’ (Bond and Exley, 2016, 169). 
350.org has also been a pioneer in ‘directed-network campaigning’ but the 
experience of the Sanders campaign suggests a variety of ways in which that 
approach might be further refined. For example, Australian activist group 
GetUp has adopted phone campaigning and further refined the technology both 
to increase the number of meaningful phone calls to be made as well as allow 
phone campaigning to be conducted by people from their homes. GetUp! then 
passed on this technology to progressive activists in UK to use in the 2017 UK 
election.. 
One theme implicit in the analysis above, is that the climate war is one that 
must be fought on many different fronts, harnessing the combined efforts of 
many different protagonists. The divestment movement, for example, 
notwithstanding its considerable early successes, has no pretentions to 
attacking climate change either alone or on a single front. Divestment will be 
simply one strategy amongst many and 350 will be one activist organisation 
amongst others, albeit that it may well play a leading role in a broader Climate 
Convergence. What is needed, is ‘coordinated action and collaboration across 
fronts of struggle and national borders to harness the transformative power we 
already possess as a thousand separate movements’ (Global Climate 
Convergence 2017). Even this however, will not be enough. As described above, 
the climate movement must extend its reach beyond existing networks between 
activist groups and embrace new networks wherever common cause can be 
found, seeking to build a ‘winning coalition of believers whose conceptions of 
socially desirable activity set the terms for subsequent moral debate’ (Suchman, 
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1995, 592). To do so effectively will require an understanding of the role of webs 
of influence and how they might best be harnessed to the climate change cause.  
 
3. Webs of influence 
While the forces arrayed against the divestment movement have enormous 
material and structural power, while people are psychologically ‘hard-wired’ to 
reject climate change bad news and while there is considerable political and 
economic resistance to taking action on the scale that it needed, it is far from 
inevitable that a transformational movement built around climate change will 
fail. Braithwaite and Drahos’s definitive empirical project on global business 
regulation (2000) shows how ‘webs of influence’ involving multiple actors with 
multiple agendas relying on a diversity of strategies and mechanisms, can in 
combination play important roles in steering events on the global stage. Webs of 
dialogue, for example, are available to the weak as well as to the strong and can 
variously induce cooperation, communicate informal praise and blame, build 
capacity, develop normative commitments and create spaces for complex 
interdependency (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, 553).  
Crucially, on their evidence, even weak strands in webs of influence often 
become strong by being tied to other weak strands. For example, non-state 
actors committed to climate change action that might connect in this manner 
include: an investor coalition engaging with major extractives and utilities 
companies (‘Aiming for A’); NGOs introducing climate change resolutions at the 
Annual General Meetings of companies with major carbon footprints 
(ClientEarth and ShareAction); others acting as ‘conceptive ideologists’ 
introducing the language of financial markets - stranded assets and carbon 
bubbles - into climate change debates (Carbon Tracker); the compilation of a 
comprehensive collection of self-reported environmental data on the carbon 
emissions of major corporations. (the CDP); the mobilisation of a critical mass 
of institutional investors committed to decarbonising their portfolios (Portfolio 
Decarbonization Coalition); and a network of large pension fund and asset 
managers who take a pro-active approach to managing risks and opportunities 
related to climate change (Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change). 
Sometimes too, allies emerge within state and international organisations: the 
United Nations Environment Program, the World Bank and the International 
Energy Agency are amongst those who have spoken out in favour of divestment. 
Meanwhile, The Guardian newspaper, under the umbrella of its ‘Keep it In the 
Ground’ campaign, and in partnership with 350, has also done much to draw 
attention to the climate crisis. And although the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation resisted 350’s demands to divest, it has subsequently contributed 
$2 billion to breakthrough renewable energy projects.  
While few of the above actors have significant institutional power they may yet 
prove capable of enrolling ‘more and more actors of increasingly greater clout to 
a project of network confrontation with the strong’ (Braithwaite, 2004, 330). 
This is precisely what happened when NGO Carbon Tracker’s analysis of the 
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vulnerability of financial markets to ‘stranded assets’ and a ‘carbon bubble’ was 
taken up by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney. He used the 
authority of his office not only to warn of the dangers that climate change raises 
for financial markets but to trigger a G20 Financial Stability Board investigation 
on the need for greater climate risk disclosure (Carney, 2016).  
Similarly, the warnings about the potentially calamitous nature of climate 
change for investors and financial markets, issued by many of the actors 
identified in the previous paragraph, are increasingly resonating with parts of 
the investment industry. HSBC and Citibank, international consultants Mercer 
and McKinsey and the world’s largest asset management fund Blackrock, are 
amongst those who are now warning their clients of the pressing need to take 
climate risk seriously (Knight, 2016; Mercer, 2015).  Given that ‘organizations 
share information, pool resources, and influence one another to adopt similar 
forms of collective action and collective action frames’ (Hadden, 2015, 10) once 
leaders take on an issue, fast followers and ultimately the rump of institutional 
investors, may follow. And where the pressure on their corporate targets comes 
simultaneously from a plethora of constituencies, rather than from a single 
interest group then it is much more likely to succeed, and even more so if it 
becomes possible to divide business in the manner suggested earlier.  
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) also provide evidence that ‘when NGOs can 
enroll a credible web of controls through learning how to pull the right strands 
of that web at the right moment, they can trigger global change – and have done 
so’ (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, 612). Their chances of success will be much 
improved if they can capture the imagination of the public in powerful states, 
particularly if they are skilled in enrolling the mass media and choosing the 
‘right moment’ to act. Activist movements are becoming increasingly 
opportunistic in identifying and exploiting such moments and in seeking to 
‘consciously generate whirlwinds to take advantage of outside trigger events 
when they occur, and to sustain periods of peak activity’ (Engler and Engler, 
2016, 261). One such moment is manifesting in Australia at the time of writing, 
as the federal government proposes to provide a loan of Aus$1billion to Indian 
company Adani, to build one of the world’s biggest coal mines. The Stop Adani 
Alliance of NGOs is currently engaged high profile campaign on multiple fronts 
to stop the mine going ahead (Stop Adani).  
The relationships between the various strands of the web are many and various. 
They include loose alliances with other activist organisations and occasionally 
with other civil society groups, which serve to amplify its impact. They do so 
variously by enrolling others with similar aspirations or values, swelling the 
numbers at particular actions (in itself an indicator of impact) and by increasing 
the legitimacy of the movement through its association with other, perhaps 
more respected, civil society groups, including mainstream and more 
conservative environmental organisations. Sometimes, network participants 
enhance each other’s agency by providing mutual reputation benefits (as in 
alliances between NGOs which draw from different legitimacy communities).  
Gaining and maintaining legitimacy, particularly moral legitimacy, is 
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particularly important because it is legitimacy that converts power into 
authority and thus enables organisations to become effective agents of change.  
Sometimes, different climate NGOs play different but complementary roles. For 
example, Carbon Tracker made a considerable contribution as a conceptive 
ideologist though its conceptualization of climate change as precipitating 
‘stranded assets’ and ‘carbon bubbles’, but, it was getting only limited traction 
until 350.org effectively translated and communicated its message to a broader 
audience. Unfortunately harnessing such complementarities is still a work in 
progress. Nevertheless, such alliances can increasingly be identified, as for 
example, with the Lock the Gate alliance in Australia, which has brought 
together farmers, landholders, indigenous groups (traditional Owners) and 
others who oppose coal mining and fracking in their locality, with 350, 
Greenpeace and others environmental groups with wider concerns. Through 
such alliances it may be possible to combine the informational capability, 
technical expertise and broader networking capability of national and 
international NGOs with the “local knowledge …denser, local-scale networks, 
and powerful symbolic resources (eg locally resonant stories, images and 
messengers) that global climate change campaigns often lack”. (Green, 2018, in-
press)   
Also important to the movement’s impact are elite allies in the form of 
supportive IOs and key individuals within them, who have respectively, 
institutional and expert authority. The support of IOs is also strategically 
important since such organisations have the capacity to engage in ‘an active 
process of international socialization intended to induce norm breakers to 
become norm followers’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 902), something which 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue is crucial to achieving broad norm acceptance. 
The relationship between the divestment movement and sympathetic IOs might 
also be thought of as one of mutual reinforcement.  On the one hand, 
endorsement of divestment or recognition of the risk of stranded assets by IOs 
or influential figures within them, provides legitimacy to the divestment 
movement.  
Over time, the divestment movement may also find ways to harness financial 
institutions as gatekeepers. After all, capital markets in developed nations have 
already devised a set of institutions and actors to help provide investors with the 
timely, accurate, information they need to make informed investment decisions. 
Auditors, credit rating agencies and financial analysts might end up playing a 
similar role in relation to divestment. Ultimately too, mainstream economic 
constituencies might also be brought into coalitions for decarbonisation 
(Meckling, Kelsey, Biber  and Zysman, 2015). Although many of these business 
organisations may not share the climate movement’s broader goals, they may 
find common cause in advancing at least some aspects of the low-carbon 
transition. 
To summarise, developing a transformational social movement around climate 
change action will require a multifaceted approach. Of particular importance 
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will be building broader alliances on both sides of politics, enrolling state allies, 
linking with IOs, exploiting windows of opportunity and other external events 
and so on. Many of those activities need to be taken concurrently, and as rapidly 
as possible. Others however, are likely to be sequential. For example, an 
aggressive moral entrepreneur such as the divestment movement must advocate 
for norm change and garner broad based support to achieve it, but may only 
gain the traction necessary for co-ordinated international action when 
international organisations ‘act as conduits for the codification, monitoring and 
enforcement of policies based on those norms” (Reich, 2010, 49) 
The hope, to return to Finnemore and Sikkink’s classic account of transnational 
activist networks, is that the advocacy of norm entrepreneurs such as the 
divestment movement will be enough to mobilise multiple others, until a critical 
mass of actors embraces the emerging norm (the imperative to decarbonise) 
and a ‘tipping point’ is reached. That tipping point may well arrive when a 
sufficient number of institutional investors realise that maintaining investments 
in fossil fuel assets can only result in financial (and ecological) disaster, and 
embrace the transition to a low carbon future. At that point, driven by escalating 
civil society action, pressure from investors and a shift in public opinion, a 
number of important states, particularly those in advanced western democracies 
and (for very different reasons, China) are likely to begin in earnest to 
decarbonise their economies. A ‘cascade’ of states adopting the new norm is 
anticipated at this point, perhaps prompted by the threat of carbon tariffs. 
Subsequently, going ‘fossil-free’ becomes the new norm internationally, being 
further embedded as more states embrace it.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Keohane, Haas and Levy (1993, 14) concluded in their study, Institutions of the 
Earth, that ‘if there is one key variable accounting for policy change, it is the 
degree of domestic environmentalist pressure in major industrialised 
democracies, not the decision-making rules of the relevant international 
institution’. That pressure comes substantially from advocacy networks such as 
the divestment movement and its allies who when they succeed, ‘are among the 
most important sources of new ideas, norms and identities in the international 
system’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, x). 
While only states can impose a price on carbon, only states can turn around the 
massive hidden subsidies on fossil fuels that hold back renewables, and only 
states can change intellectual property rights to stimulate new low-carbon or 
zero carbon technologies; bottom up approaches driven by advocacy 
organisations and their allies and wider networks are also important, not least 
in stimulating changes in beliefs and norms, and through this, in influencing 
behavioural change:  ‘As ever throughout history, economic and social change 
will come from below, from a coalition of social movements and enlightened 
businesses, campaigners and visionaries’ (Jacobs, 2016, 322).  Accordingly, 
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bottom up norm development driven by civil society may well be the foundation 
on which effective state action must be built. 
Overall, the messy reality is that climate policy and governance is not only a 
process involving states and international agreements but also one involving 
civil society and the corporate sector. And it is not only an instrumental process 
of coercing changes in behaviour and in the exercise of material power, but an 
expressive and symbolic one of nurturing a new norm and institutionalizing a 
new set of moral principles. However, whether moral entrepreneurs such as the 
divestment movement, in tandem with a cluster of other climate agents, will 
realise their transformational potential and succeed in precipitating a ‘norm 
cascade’ and whether this, in conjunction with the higher level of international 
commitment evidenced by the Paris Agreement, will be enough to avert the 
cataclysm of dangerous climate change, remains an open question.  
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